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Abstract: This paper is about the topic of psychologism in the work of Kazimierz 
Twardowski and my aim is to revisit this important issue in light of recent publications 
from, and on Twardowski’s works. I will first examine the genesis of psychologism in the 
young Twardowski’s work; secondly, I will examine Twardowski’s picture theory of 
meaning and Husserl’s criticism in Logical Investigations; the third part is about 
Twardowski’s recognition and criticism of his psychologism in his lectures on the 
psychology of thinking; the fourth and fifth parts provide an overview of Twardowski’s 
paper “Actions and Products” while the sixth part addresses the psychologism issue in the 
last part of this paper through the delineation of psychology and the humanities. I shall 
conclude this study with a brief assessment of Twardowski’s solution to psychologism. 
 
Introduction 
This paper is about the topic of psychologism in the work of Kazimierz Twardowski and 
my aim is to revisit this important issue in light of recent publications from, and on 
Twardowski’s works1. Twardowski’s effort to overcome psychologism constitutes one of 
the driving forces of his thought (see van der Schaar, 2016, p. 87) and it is the main topic 
of a talk that he delivered in the Philosophical Society at the University of Vienna in 1914 
under the title “Funktionen und Gebilde” and better known by the English version: 
“Actions and Products. Comments on the Border Area of Psychology, Grammar, and 
Logic” (Twardowski, 1999a). This is confirmed by R. Ingarden in his classical paper on 
Twardowski in which he points out that the true meaning of this writing lies in the problem 
of psychologism: 
Professsor Twardowski before 1902 was a psychologist, especially in his logical 
ideas. Under the influence of volume I. of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen, he 
became aware that psychologism in logic could not be maintained. At the same time 
he could not agree, as it seems, with the positive part of Husserl’s deductions (in 
the second volume of the above mentioned work) according to which logical 
                                               
1 Twardowski, 2017, 2016, 2014 ; Meinong-Twardowski, 2016 ; M. van der Schaar, 2016; A. Brozek et al. 
(eds.), 2015; Brozek, 2011. 
creations such as notions, judgments, or theories are a certain kind of ideal object. 
Knowing what they were not, he did not yet know what they were. And in the 
above-mentioned publication he tries to answer this question: they are the products 
of psychical or psychophysical actions and as such they are not something psychical 
but something dependent on these actions, born of them, and may be changed by 
them. In other words, the essay “On Actions and Products” is another attempt to 
defeat psychologism. One may agree with it or reject it, especially in certain details 
introduced by Twardowski. Nevertheless one must admit that this attempt to pass 
between Scylla and Charybdis deserves great attention and scrupulous analysis 
(Ingarden, 1948, p. 28-29). 
 
According to Ingarden’s diagnosis, Twardowski’s solution to the problem of psychologism 
rests precisely on the distinction between action and product. I propose to follow the path 
suggested by Ingarden and to carefully examine Twardowski’s “Actions and Products” and 
his way out of psychologism. I will first examine the genesis of psychologism in the young 
Twardowski’s work; secondly, I will examine Twardowski’s picture theory of meaning 
and Husserl’s criticism in the Logical Investigations; the third part is about Twardowski’s 
recognition and criticism of his psychologism in his lectures on the psychology of thinking; 
The fourth and fifth parts provide an overview of Twardowski’s paper “Actions and 
Products” while the sixth part addresses the psychologism issue in the last part of this paper 
through the delineation of psychology and the humanities.. I shall conclude this study with 
a brief assessment of Twardowski’s solution to psychologism. 
 
1. The genesis of psychologism in the young Twardowski’s work  
A quote from Twardowski’s autobiography provides insights into the genesis of his 
treatment of the problem of psychologism in his early work and the impact of Husserl’s 
criticism in his Logical Investigations. It is about the impact of Husserl’s criticism on the 
course of his thought as well as his position vis-à-vis psychology, its method, and its 
relationship to other sciences, in particular to philosophy. 
The philosophical views of mine have of course undergone certain changes in the 
course of time, changes that I understand to represent an evolution toward a more 
secure knowledge. In this context, the most worthy of mention is my position vis-
à-vis psychology, its method, and its relationship to other sciences – to philosophy, 
especially. In this regard, my point of view was initially identical with that of 
Brentano – a view to which Marty, among others, also subscribed: psychology is 
the fundamental philosophical science. I promulgated this point of view, and 
substantiated it in a paper that I read in 1897, which was subsequently published as 
“Psychology vs. Physiology and Philosophy”. But Husserl’s logical Investigations, 
which appeared some years later (1900/1), convinced me that it is impossible to 
treat psychological, that is, empirically acquired knowledge as the basis of logical, 
thus a priori propositions. My book on the basic concepts of didactics and logic 
was written prior to my study of Husserl’s work, so that in it I still came forth as an 
“exponent of psychologism”. But my psychologism of that period manifests itself 
more in the demarcation of the material to be dealt with than in the manner of its 
treatment. For I maintain in general that the opposition between psychologism and 
anti-psychologism in logic is ultimately an issue that pertains to the scope of its 
domain rather than to the theoretical grounding of its propositions (Twardowski, 
1999c, p. 30-31.  
 
In this excerpt, Twardowski points out that his initial position was that of Brentano, a 
position which he also attributes to Marty, and it merely consisted in conceiving of 
psychology as the “fundamental philosophical science” (die philosophische 
Grundwissenschaft). This is the position that he seems to advocate in “Psychology vs. 
Physiology and Philosophy” and implicitly in his earlier works, especially in his 1894 book 
On the Content and Object of Presentations as far as it can be considered a contribution to 
Brentano’s program. However, unlike Brentano who never took seriously Husserl’s 
objections, Twardowski seems to recognize that it was Husserl’s objections against logical 
psychologism which forced him to abandon what he considered his own psychologism. 
The most substantial writing in which Twardowski argues against psychologism dates back 
from his 1908-1909 lectures “Psychology of thinking” in which he examines three 
arguments against logical psychologism, including the one based on the distinction 
between functions and products, which he later systematically works out in “Actions and 
Products”. 
Let’s first have a quick look at Twardowski’s paper “Psychology vs. Physiology and 
Philosophy” in which, according to his intellectual autobiography, he advocates a form of 
psychologism. The kind of psychologism that he opposes to what he calls “metaphysicism” 
in §7 of this paper boils down to the idea that psychology acquires the status of first 
philosophy, i.e. becomes the cornerstone of philosophy as a whole. He criticizes the 
Neokantian philosophers from Bade, namely W. Windelband, because of the sharp division 
they maintain between psychology and philosophy, and because they assimilate 
psychology to a natural science such as physiology. He sees in descriptive psychology a 
form of reaction to “metaphysicism”, i.e. metaphysics as first philosophy in the traditional 
sense of the term: 
Hence, it is difficult to ignore the fact that this very characterisation of philosophy 
which banishes psychology from the realm of the philosophical sciences overlooks 
one of the most characteristic features of contemporary philosophical work. The 
feature is captured by the term psychologism, and in a way it reveals a reaction 
against philosophy’s earlier metaphysicism For it was not only psychological 
studies that in their time were heavily dependent on metaphysical views; it was the 
same with the analysis of aesthetic, ethical, and in part even logical problems 
(Twardowski, 1999d, p. 57).  
Accordingly, the revolution that occurred in philosophy in the study of psychology as of 
ethics or aesthetics, for example, consists in the way of conceiving and approaching the 
subject matter of these disciplines. We can think of the definition of psychology as a 
science of the soul which Brentano criticizes at the very beginning of his Psychology 
(Brentano, 1995, p. 2 f.) and which he opposes to psychology understood as a science of 
mental phenomena whose task primarily consists in the analysis and description of thought 
and conscious experience in general. Twardowski justifies the privileged philosophical 
status granted to descriptive psychology by emphasizing the role of internal experience as 
a source of our knowledge of psychical life and because it provides its method and subject 
matter to philosophy: 
Consequently, psychology supplies philosophy not only with its method but also 
with its subject-matter. If we did not have inner experience, and consequently had 
no knowledge of the manifestations of mental life, then not only could psychology 
not exist, but there would be no logic, no ethics, no esthetics, no theory of 
knowledge, not even metaphysics (Twardowski, 1999d, p. 59). 
Worth mentioning is Twardowski’s reference to Stumpf’s article “Psychology and Theory 
of Knowledge” (Stumpf, 1891) which represents the first systematic study on the topic of 
psychologism and which has been instrumental in Husserl’s views on psychologism in 
Prolegomena to pure logic (see Fisette, 2015a). We shall see that Twardowski’s own 
definition of psychologism is not foreign to that of Stumpf.2  Although Twardowski’s 
                                               
2 In his 1891 article, Stumpf opposes two schools of thought on the question of the relationship between 
psychology and theory of knowledge: Kantian criticism that dissociates the theory of knowledge from 
psychology, and psychologism which Stumpf defines in this paper as “the reduction of all philosophical 
investigation, and especially all epistemological investigations, to psychology” (Stumpf, 1891, p. 468). The 
main argument in favor of psychologism boils down to the idea that “knowledge is itself a mental process 
and accordingly the study of its conditions would be a psychological investigation” (Stumpf, 1891, p. 468). 
The opponents to psychologism, on the other hand, argue that a psychological investigation can never lead 
to “knowledge of general and necessary truths” (Stumpf, 1891, p. 469). Stumpf’s own position in this debate 
reference to Stumpf in this paper was primarily meant to emphasize his position on the 
need of descriptive psychology for a viable theory of knowledge, it strikes me as obvious 
that Stumpf constitutes an essential source not only in his criticism of psychologism in his 
later writings, but also, as we shall see below, in his distinction between action and 
product.3  
 
2. Twardowski’s picture theory of meaning and Husserl’s criticism in the Logical 
Investigations 
In his autobiography, Twardowski recognizes the major influence he received from 
Husserl’s criticism in Logical Investigations, but he was unaware of the existence of 
Husserl’s earlier writings in which he examines in detail Twardowski’s On the Content 
and Object of Presentations. The first is the well-known manuscript “Intentionale 
Gegenstände” written in 1894 in response to his reception of Twardowski’s work (Husserl, 
1990-1991); the second piece is Husserl’s review of Twardowski’s book which has been 
posthumously published (Husserl, 1994a).4 Husserl’s objections in his Logical 
Investigations have been formulated for the most part in these two writings. The two main 
objections which are of particular interest for my study relate to Twardowski’s picture 
(Bild) theory, more precisely to his theory of intentionality and his psychologizing 
conception of meaning and intentional content. These two objections are clearly formulated 
in § 45 of the fifth Investigation entitled “The presentational Content” in which Husserl 
                                               
consists in granting to Kantians that necessary truths are irreducible to facts while admitting, with 
psychologists, that psychology is essential to the theory of knowledge. Hence the main mistake he attributes 
to Kant and his followers: refusing the assistance of psychological research in their theory of knowledge 
(Stumpf, 1891, p. 493, 500). 
3 Let’s bear in mind that Twardowski was acquainted with Stumpf since 1892, the year after the publication 
of Stumpf’s paper on psychologism. In his autobiography, Twardowski says that immediately after his 
dissertation on Descartes in 1892, he went to Leipzig where he met Külpe, then Wundt’s assistant, to then 
move to Munich to attend Stumpf’s lectures: “Von Leipzig ging es für das Sommersemester 1892 nach 
München zu Karl Stumpf, der mich auf das freundlichste aufnahm; ich hörte seine Vorlesungen, nahm an 
den von ihm geleiteten philosophischen Übungen teil, wurde von ihm in sein Haus eingeladen und durfte mit 
ihm musizieren. Die damals mit Stumpf angeknüpften persönlichen Beziehungen erwiesen sich – gleich wie 
jene mit Külpe – zu meiner großen Freude und zu meinem großen Gewinn als dauernde“ (Twardowski, 2017, 
p. 6). During the summer semester of 1892, Stumpf taught the following courses: 1. Logik und Hauptpunkte 
der Metaphysik (4 Wochenstunden); 2. Ausgewählte Fragen der Ästhetik (2 Wochenstunden); 3. 
Philosophische Übungen (I Wochenstunde) (see Brozek, 2011). 
4 On Husserl’s early criticism of Twardowski, see Cavallin, 1977; Fisette, 2003. 
criticizes Twardowski for not distinguishing, within the content of an act, logical meaning 
(intentional content of a judgment) from its sensory content (i.e. sensations and images).5  
How dubious ‘blanket’ talk about ‘content’ can be, when we merely oppose act, 
content and object, is shown by the difficulties and confusions into which 
Twardowski fell, and which have in part been exposed above. We may point 
particularly to his talk of ‘presentative activity moving in two directions’, his 
complete ignoring of meaning in the ideal sense, his psychologistic elimination of 
plain differences of meaning by recourse to etymological distinctions and, lastly, 
his treatment of the doctrine of ‘intentional inexistence’ and the doctrine of 
universal objects (Husserl, 1982b, p. 175). 
 
This excerpt summarizes Husserl’s main objections in his Logical Investigations as well as 
in his 1894 manuscripts against Twardowski’s picture theory of meaning and his immanent 
theory of intentionality in his book On the Content and Object of Presentations. Husserl’s 
first target is Twardowski’s notion of content understood in his Hauptwerk as a picture, 
and Twardowski uses the case of painting (Bild) to illustrate the way in which the content 
and object of an act are articulated: 
As is well known, one says that the painter paints a picture (Bild), but also that he 
paints a landscape. One and the same activity of the painter is directed toward two 
objects; the result of the activity is only one. After the painter has finished the 
painting of the picture and of the landscape, respectively, he has before him a 
painted picture as well as a painted landscape. The picture is painted; it is neither 
engraved, nor etched, etc.; it is a painted, real picture. The landscape, too, is painted, 
but it is not a real landscape, only a “painted one.” The painted picture and the 
painted landscape are in truth only one; for the picture depicts a landscape, hence it 
is a painted landscape; the painted landscape is a picture (Bild) of the landscape 
(Twardowski, 1977, p. 12).  
In order to explain the dual meaning of the word “painted” in this excerpt both as an 
external object and as an internal content (or object), Twardowski uses the distinction 
between modifying and attributive determination which he generally applies to the 
meaning of a term, i.e. for example, to the meaning of the word “man” in a “good” man, 
which is attributive, whereas the determination “dead” is modifying in the expression “a 
                                               
5 In his critical discussion of Twardowski’s book, Husserl (1994a, p. 389) reproaches him for not 
understanding Bolzano’s Sätze an sich and deplores the lack of distinction in his treatment of the concept of 
presentation between psychological and logical contents:  I. The real, psychological content (Gehalt); and 
indeed a) the Representing act, b) the Representing content. II. The Ideal, logical content (Gehalt); and indeed 
a) the signification, b) the object. 
dead man”.6 Thus, the word “painted” has an attributive meaning when it is applied to the 
painting (to distinguish it from an engraving, for example), and it has a modifying meaning 
when applied to a landscape because, of course, the painted landscape is not itself a 
landscape but precisely a picture or an image as Twardowski explains in the next quote: 
The content of a presentation and the presented object are one and the same thing. 
The expression ‘presented’ is a modifying determination of the object; for the 
presented object is no longer an object, but is merely the content of a presentation. 
The painted landscape, too, as we pointed out, is no longer a landscape, but a picture 
(Bild) (Twardowski, 1977, p. 13). 
As far as the articulation between the act, its content, and its object is concerned, 
Twardowski again uses the example of painting to illustrate this case: 
For the painter, the picture is the means by which to depict the landscape; 
he wants to picture, paint, a real or merely imagined landscape, and he does 
so in painting a picture. He paints a landscape in making, painting, a picture 
of this landscape. The landscape is the “primary” object of his painting 
activity; the picture is the “secondary” object. Analogously for 
presentations (Twardowski, 1977, p. 16). 
I take it that the painter is conscious of both the landscape, as an external or transcendent 
object, and the painting as an internal object.7 One could also consider this duality as a new 
version of the direction of an act towards its primary object: the painting, like the content 
or the image, is the means by which the transcendent object, the landscape, is presented. 
This is apparently its primary function. But the painter could turn his attention toward the 
painted landscape and thus adopt a “modified” attitude toward the content, and he would 
then have a secondary object in mind8. To quote Twardowski’s elegant formulation: 
                                               
6 In his edition of Twardowski’s book, R. Haller (1982, p. XIII) points out that it is also by means of this 
distinction between modifying and attributive determination that Twardowski seeks to solve the problem of 
objectless representations, i.e., the problem of knowing how something which, in principle, can not to exist 
because it is contradictory, must nevertheless exist or subsist as an object of presentation. The term existence 
can also be used in a modifying sense when one says of the object that it exists in an act or as an object of 
presentation. 
7 “It is the presented object in the first sense which can be affirmed or denied through a judgment. In order 
to be judged, the object has to be first presented; what is not presented can as little be affirmed or denied as 
it can be loved or hated. Yet the affirmed or denied object, the desired or detested object, is a presented object 
only in the second of the two mentioned meanings. The presented object in the first mentioned sense of the 
word “presented” is not what is affirmed or denied; one does not have it in mind when one says that an object 
exists or does not exist. The presented object in this sense is the content of the presentation, the “mental 
picture” of an object” (Twardowski, 1977, p. 14). Needless to mention here the implicit reference to 
Brentano’s thesis of the founding character of the class of acts of presentation. 
8 Twardowski’s distinction between primary and secondary object does not exactly match that of Brentano 
for whom the secondary object is actually the very act of presenting. 
We shall say of the content that it is thought, presented, in the presentation; we shall 
say of the object that it is presented through the content of the presentation (or 
through the presentation). What is presented in a presentation is its content; what is 
presented through a presentation is its object (Twardowski, 1877, p. 16). 
In other words, the content has a mediating function between the act of presenting and the 
object presented, it is the medium through which an object is presented. 
In Husserl’s quote above, his main criticism pertains, in addition to Twardowski’s theory 
of intentionality, to the dual direction of an act, both toward its own content and toward an 
object. For Twardowski, when one thinks of a landscape, one has two objects before the 
mind, the real landscape and the mere picture.  By recognizing that a thought is primarily 
in contact with transcendent objects and indirectly with one’s own presentations, 
Twardowski takes a first step towards the overcoming of an immanentist theory of 
intentionality à la Brentano. But in arguing that one can think of these transcendent objects 
only by means of immanent internal objects, he keeps a foot firmly anchored in Brentano’s 
early theory of intentionality. As to Husserl’s objection to logical psychologism, although 
Twardowski does not explicitly advocate a psychologizing position in his 1894 work in so 
far as he does not seek to reduce the laws of logic to psychological laws such as J. Stuart 
Mill, for example, the result seems to be nevertheless the same since by not recognizing 
the ideal character of meaning, on which Husserl’s main argument against logical 
psychologism is based, and by assimilating logical meaning to psychological content, he 
is inescapably driven on the path of psychologism. 
 
3. Twardowski’s self-criticism in his lectures on the psychology of thinking 
Twardowski’s first public reaction to the objection of psychologism seems to occur in his 
lectures on the psychology of thinking (Twardowski, 2014a, p. 134-136) in which logic is 
defined as “the science of correct thinking”, and thus as “a component of psychology” 
(Twardowski, 2014a, p. 134). Twardowski explains why this position must be rejected and 
provides three arguments against it. The first, which he only mentions in these lectures, is 
that logic “emerged and developed independently from psychology” (Twardowski, 2014a, 
p. 134). The second argument, which has also been formulated both in Stumpf’s article9  
                                               
9 This is also Stumpf’s main argument in his paper on psychologism. He agrees with Kant and the 
Neokantians that one must maintain a strict concept of necessity and thus oppose the reduction of the 
principles and laws of logic to mere empirical generalizations. Stumpf here refers explicitly to J. S. Mill and 
and Husserl’s Prolegomena (1982a, p. 40 f.), is that the laws of psychology are mere 
“generalizations of experiential data in empirical sciences” and are therefore only probable; 
on the other hand, scientific laws such as those in logic are, to quote Twardowski, 
“apodictic and independent from experience, logic being an a priori science (Twardowski, 
2014a, p. 135). Now, since the laws of logic thus understood cannot be based on mere 
empirical generalizations and probable statements of an empirical science such as 
psychology, logic cannot therefore be based on psychology. Twardowski’s third argument 
is of particular interest for my study because it is based on the distinction between mental 
function (thinking) and its content (thought). This argument is nicely summarized in this 
excerpt: 
This is because the object of logic is thought, not thinking; not a mental function 
but rather its product. (...) The difference between thinking and its product is very 
clear when, among other things, one considers the relationship of both of them to 
speech; for instance, the meaning of the word “the Sun” is identical with the thought 
of the Sun; making present or realizing the meaning of the word “the Sun” is 
identical with thinking of the Sun to oneself. [...] These are mental facts, whereas a 
thought, a conviction, or a judgment is a product of these facts (Twardowski, 2014a, 
p. 135-136). 
To this distinction between function and product corresponds that between the field of 
psychology, i.e. thinking in general, and that of logic and the remaining philosophical 
sciences, i.e., products. To quote Twardowski once again: “Discussion of judgment is the 
domain of logic, which studies them according to their veracity or falsity, whereas 
psychology deals with the function of judging, that is, a certain kind of a function of 
thinking” (Twardowski, 2014a, p. 136). This last argument is further worked out in 
“Actions and products” which I shall now examine. 
 
4. Preliminary remarks on “Funtions und Products” 10 
                                               
maintains that the laws of nature and the principles of logic such as the principle of non-contradiction, for 
example, cannot be acquired merely by induction and are irreducible as such to a process of empirical 
generalization or “an accumulation of observations” (Stumpf, 1891, p. 499-500).  
 
10 This writing was the subject of a two-part conference before the Philosophical Society of Vienna in 1914, 
both with the title of “Funktionen und Gebilde”. There are many versions of this text in several languages, 
including the English version that I use in my paper, which is the full and commented translation of the Polish 
text and it bears the title “Actions and Products. Some Remarks from the Borderline of Psychology, Grammar 
and Logic” (Twardowski, 1999a). There is also, in Twardowski’s archives in Warsaw, a partial sketch of a 
French translation of the first two sections (§§1-28) prepared by Twardowski himself, entitled « Fonctions 
et produits. Quelques remarques aux confins de la psychologie, de la grammaire et de la logique ».  The 
In “Functions and products”, Twardowski resumes his discussion on the content and object 
of presentations where he left it in 1894, and his main purpose in this study is to revisit in 
depth the notion of content in light of the notion of Gebilde (product). Unlike his 1894 
work in which his analysis focused more specifically on the relationship between content 
and object of presentations, this study pertains to an act’s relation to its content, i.e., the 
correlation between functions and their products.11 However, Twardowski’s analysis in this 
important paper is not limited to mental phenomena and psychology. Twardowski’s 
originality here consists among other things in extending the correlation function-product 
to the field of physical and psychophysical phenomena and to language in general. Like 
most of Brentano’s students, he proposes a new classification of functions and products 
which, while preserving the hierarchy between the classes of functions and mental 
products, emphasizes what he calls the class of physical and psychophysical functions and 
products which he examines in the second part of this study. 
Moreover, according to Twardowski’s indications in §10 regarding the historical origins 
of this distinction between functions and products, these concepts are to be understood in 
the sense that Stumpf uses them in his two 1906 Academy treatises.12 It is true that 
Twardowski associates this distinction with several other philosophers, and namely with 
Witasek (1908), but careful examination shows that only Stumpf offers a thorough analysis 
of this distinction, and for the reasons that I mentioned above, it makes no doubt that he is 
Twardowski’s major source of inspiration in this writing.  
In “Phenomena and Psychic Functions”, Stumpf argues that mental functions and sensory 
phenomena, though intimately linked (they can only be distinguished by abstraction), are 
irreducible to one another and belong to distinct domains. The notion of mental function 
                                               
recent German edition (Twardowski, 2017a) and the recent French edition (Twardowski, 2007) take into 
account variations and differences between the Polish and German editions. There are differences between 
the English and the German edition which is more complete and which I will quote when it is necessary. 
 
11 Notice the common root of the terms Bild (in Twardowski’s picture theory) and Gebilde (something which 
is “gebildet” or formed) in his late theory even if a Gebilde is not considered in this paper the product of a 
depiction. 
12 In this paper, Twardowski refers to Stumpf’s “Phenomena and Psychic Functions” (1906a) and “On the 
Classification of Sciences” (1906b) as well as to Witasek’s book Grundlinien der Psychologie (1908, p. 84-
85) in which Witasek succinctly applies the passive / active distinction to functions. But there is nothing in 
this book compared to Stumpf’s treatment and the importance he granted to this distinction in his descriptive 
psychology. 
corresponds, in the vocabulary of Brentano and most of his students, to psychical 
phenomena (we use in the same sense the terms acts and mental states), and it refers in 
Stumpf to the act of noticing phenomena and their relations, the synthesis of complex 
phenomena, the formation of concepts, apprehension and judgment, emotion, desire, and 
will, etc. (Stumpf, 1906a, p. 4). The study of these acts belongs to descriptive psychology, 
understood in the narrow sense of the science of the psychical functions, while the other 
elements involved in the accomplishment of an intentional act, from sense perception to 
voluntary actions, namely sense phenomena, intentional content and relations, all belong 
to different domains and sciences. This is particularly the case of Gebilde, which Stumpf 
defines as the necessary correlates of psychical functions (1906a, p.28 f.) and which he 
conceives of as the specific contents of each of the classes and subclasses of mental 
functions. For example, both Ehrenfels’s gestalt qualities and Husserl’s figural moments 
fall under the concept of Gebilde/product in the same way as values, for example, as we 
shall see later. To designate the specific content or Gebilde of the functions belonging to 
the class of judgments, Stumpf uses the concept of state of affairs which is expressed 
linguistically in “subordinate clauses” (daß-Sätzen) or in the form of “substantivized 
infinitive”. Gebilde also occur both in intellectual and emotional functions, and in the latter 
case it is conceived as a value. These Gebilde are objective entities which are similar both 
to Meinong’s concept of objective, to Husserl’s objectity, and to Bolzano’s “proposition in 
itself.” (Stumpf, 1906b, 30). For this student of Lotze, the doctrine of Gebilde is not 
incompatible with the Platonic theory of ideas though “without its metaphysical 
conclusions” (Stumpf, 1906a, 33). One can certainly entertain a product such as a state of 
affairs without having it as an actual content of judgment, but it is then a mere abstraction. 
This is because, says Stumpf, “the state of affairs cannot be immediately given for itself 
independently of any mental function, and therefore effectively. It can only be real as the 
content of an actual judgment, i.e., a function which is actually taking place. [...] So, 
functions (and indeed only the conscious functions which are properly present) are facts 
immediately known, while the Gebilde are facts only regarded as contents of functions” 
(Stumpf, 1906b, p. 32). Stumpf’s main arguments against logical psychologism are based 
on this form of objectivism. 
Moreover, in “On the Classification of Sciences”, Stumpf maintains that the study of 
Gebilde belongs to this new science called “eidology” (Stumpf, 1906b, p. 32 f.) which he 
describes in the following excerpt:  
die Untersuchung der „Gebilde“. Also die Lehre von den Begriffen, ihrem 
Verhältnis zu den Erscheinungen und zueinander; dann die Lehre von den 
Inbegriffen, speziell den Formen, worüber sich mancherlei allgemeine Sätze 
werden aufstellen lassen; weiter die Lehre von den Sachverhalten in allen ihren 
formalen Eigenschaften und gegen seitigen Beziehungen, z.B. vom Unterschiede 
der Tatsache und der Gesetze, der unmittelbaren und mittelbaren Wahrheiten, der 
einfachen und der in verschiedener Weise zusammengesetzten Sachverhalte, vom 
Zusammenhang und Bedingungsverhältnis der Sachverhalte, kurz alles, was man 
in der Logik als Eigenschaften und Unterschiede von Urteilen ihrem Inhalte nach, 
sowie als Schlußregeln aufzuzahlen pflegt. Endlich aber auch die Lehre von den 
Werten, ihren allgemeinsten Klassen, ihren Zusammenhängen, ihrem System 
(Gütertafel). (Stumpf, 1906b, p. 32-33) 
Understood in this sense, adds Stumpf, eidology is very close to Husserl’s pure logic in the 
Prolegomena to Pure Logic. 
 
5. Overview of Twardowski’s “Actions and Products” 
Twardowski’s paper is divided into three parts. In the first part (§§ 1-9), he examines the 
distinction between function and product through the grammatical distinction between verb 
and noun like, for example: walking-walk, running-run, jumping-jump, speaking-speech, 
thinking-thought, judging-judgment, etc. In his analysis of the verbal forms of the type 
presenting / presentation and judging / judgment, he points out that, in most cases, the verb 
stands for an activity, a process, or more generally for a function. It marks the dynamic 
moment of the function while the corresponding name has a static moment. In terms of the 
grammatical form, the substantive is similar to what Twardowski calls the figura 
etymologica according to which the judged or represented names are the internal objects 
of the judging or presenting. This is clearly formulated in the following quote:  
dass es etwas bedeutet, was dank der durch das Zeitwort bezeichneten Funktion 
zustande kommt, entsteht. Das, was durch eine Tätigkeit, einen Vorgang, 
allgemein durch eine Funktion entsteht, zustande kommt, was sich dank dieser 
Funktion bildet, lässt sich als ein Gebilde bezeichnen. In diesem Sinne ist also 
das den Titel meiner Ausführungen bildende Wortpaar Funktion-Gebilde zu 
verstehen (Twardowski, 2017a, p. 189). 
All substantives that are formed on the same root as the corresponding verb are internal 
objects. Moreover, there is a close relationship between the grammarians’ figura 
etymologica and the notion of correlation, for example that between the act of perceiving 
and the perceived, by which the intentionality of psychical experiences is generally 
characterized. In this work, Twardowski again uses the distinction between internal and 
external object by which he meant the immanent content and the transcendent object of an 
act of presentation. Moreover, this paper confirms that he still maintains the idea of a dual 
direction of an act which is in no way affected by the modifications brought about to the 
concept of immanent content through the introduction of that of product: 
So ist z. B. beim Urteilen das Urteil das innere Objekt; das, worüber geurteilt wird, 
ist das äußere Objekt oder der Gegenstand des Urteilens und zugleich des Urteils. 
Meinong drückt dies bekanntlich so aus, dass er sagt, das Urteil wird geurteilt, der 
Gegenstand wird beurteilt. (Analog sagt man, das Buch werde gedruckt, das Papier 
werde bedruckt u.a.m.) (Twardowski, 2017a, p. 176). 
The notion of “geurteilt” (judged) in this quote refers to the content of an act of judgment 
that belongs to a class of products that he examines in the other two parts of the paper. All 
we need to know for the moment is that this internal object is the result of an act or “that 
which arises owing to, as the result of, some action, i.e., by means of that action” 
(Twardowski, 1999a, p. 108), and this something is also named a product to indicate that 
these contents are realized thanks to an act on which they depend and to designate the very 
process at the origin of the formation of these contents. 
The second part of the text bears on the classification of functions and products. 
Twardowski (2017a, p. 191) proposes in fact a dual classification and provides the 
following diagram to illustrate it: 
[Functions and Formations] 
Physical      psychical 
  Purely physical      psychophysical 
----------- 
Products 
Non-enduring       enduring 
 
The first classification is based on Brentano’s distinction between physical and psychical 
phenomena which is applied both to functions and products. In the class of products and 
physical functions, he further distinguishes those which are purely physical from those 
which are psychophysical. The second classification only applies to products and it 
distinguishes the class of enduring from that of non-enduring products. Twardowski argues 
that this function-formation correlation can be found in all cases, such as walking, running, 
or jumping, which involve a physical activity, i.e. in this case, a bodily movement of the 
agent. Hence the use of the terms “action” and “product” to designate, on the one hand, the 
action of running, walking and jumping, and, on the other hand, the product of these 
actions, i.e. run, walk, and jump.13  
Gebilde or products and physical functions are further distinguished into those which are 
purely physical and those which are psychophysical. For example, the pair crying-cry 
belongs to the class of purely physical functions and products when it is a bodily 
movement, i.e., a mere mechanical reflex, a non-voluntary, or non-intentional movement. 
But in this case, we are not dealing with an action as such, i.e., an intentional behavior. On 
the other hand, psychophysical functions and products are characterized by their relation 
to psychical functions. 
A physical action is psychophysical if it is accompanied by a mental action that 
exerts some sort of influence on the course of the physical action, and therewith on 
the resultant product; now the product that originates in this way is also called 
psychophysical (Twardowski, 1999a, p. 109). 
We shall see that all actions, such as crying or writing, speaking, or painting, express 
something, for example an emotion, which should not be confused with their meaning 
proper. 
The second classification, though simpler, is just as important as the first one for 
Twardowski’s project in this text. It only bears on products and concerns, at first sight, the 
(temporal) relationship that these maintain with psychical or physical functions. It is based 
on the distinction between enduring and non-enduring products. A psychophysical product 
like a cry belongs to the class of non-enduring formations because the duration of its 
existence coincides with that of the act that produces it - for example the cry disappears 
along with the action or function of crying. On the other hand, enduring products such as 
                                               
13 Notice however that the use of the terms action and product to refer to mental states is counterintuitive 
and in many respects misleading because a judgment, for example, is not an action as such, i.e. a bodily 
movement guided by a practical intention, and its content or Gebilde seems to me to be poorly rendered by 
the term product which evokes the idea of producing a propositional content rather than actualizing it. 
However, the use of the terms action and product is justified in the case of functions and physical products 
insofar as the relation between an action and its product is a causal relation. But this terminology does not fit 
well with cases falling under the class of mental functions to the extent that they are intentional. 
writing and painting, are products that last longer than their functions because a function 
like writing, unlike the verb crying, has in addition to an internal object, like the writing, 
an external object that serves as a support or material that exists independently of this 
function.14 
Moreover, Twardowski distinguishes internal objects, to which mental functions relate, 
from external objects such as the painter’s canvas and his instruments, which pre-exist the 
formations and serve as material or support for the products, such as a painting, and which 
thus enable it to persist through time. This is the case of both a footprint left in the sand 
and a drawing on a sheet of paper, the latter being a psychophysical product which also 
presupposes a psychical function and a transcendent object (the presented landscape). 
Moreover, enduring products as such are distinguished from materials developed through 
the use of functions in that they constitute the configurations and groupings that result from 
the processing or the work of the function.15 In the third section, he evaluates the possible 
“crossover” of the elements of these two classifications, in particular that of the class of 
enduring products with the subclass of psychophysical functions and products. 
In addition to the taxonomic issues which occupy much of this last section, one of 
Twardowski’s major concerns is the status of these products, which have a longer duration 
than the functions that produce them or the temporary products that are fixed by technical 
means. In § 39, Twardowski first distinguishes what a product expresses from what it 
means. A cry can express pain just as a work of art necessarily expresses the sentiments of 
                                               
14 That is what Twardowski explains in the following quote from the important § 26 of this paper: “Dass 
überhaupt gewisse Gebilde die sie erzeugende Funktion überdauern, ist dadurch möglich, dass die diese 
Gebilde erzeugenden Funktionen äussere Objekte haben, auf die sie sich beziehen, sich an etwas vollziehen, 
an etwas vorgehen, an etwas vorgenommen werden, was bereits vor Beginn der Funktion existiert und nach 
Aufhören der Funktion weiter besteht. Dieses Etwas ist das Material, aus welchem die Funktion ihr Gebilde 
bildet. [...] Die Funktion, welche ein dauerndes Gebilde erzeugt, erschafft dieses Gebilde nicht etwa aus 
Nichts, sondern besteht vielmehr in einer an etwas schon Bestehendem vorgenommenen Veränderung, einer 
Umgestaltung; diese Umgestaltung verändert die gegenseitige Lage der Teile des Materials oder nimmt etwas 
anderes an ihm vor. Wer, über weichen Boden schreitend, einen Abdruck seines Fußes hinterlässt, verändert 
einfach die gegenseitige Lage der Bodenpartikel, und diese ihre veränderte Lage beharrt kürzer oder länger 
auch, nachdem die Funktion des Veränderns der Lage, also des den-Fuß-Abdrückens, bereits vorüber ist. 
Deshalb eben ist die im Boden hinterlassene Fußspur ein dauerndes Gebilde. Genau genommen ist also als 
Gebilde nur die neue Gruppierung zu bezeichnen, die neue Lage, die erfolgte Veränderung des Materials – 
diese Ausdrücke im Sinne von Gebilde und nicht im Sinne der Funktion genommen; das Material bestand ja 
schon vorher“ (Twardowski, 2017a, p. 177). 
15 We do not yet know how these products emerge, so to speak, from this functional process, but we can 
already establish a link with the notion of Gestalt since, as Twardowski (2017a, 178) explicitly suggests, 
Ehrenfels Gestalt qualities are Gebilde that are specific to the class of presentations. 
the artist. But the meaning of such psychophysical products is not exhausted in the 
expression of emotions or feelings, for such products, in addition to expressing, mean 
something, and their meaning is comparable to what Stumpf calls the “invariants of 
Gebilde” (Twardowski, 2017a, p. 184), that is to say:  
Precisely the common attributes (in which the individual products accord) that we 
ordinarily regard as the meaning of the psychophysical product, as the concept 
inherent in it, provided of course that these common attributes correspond to the 
intent with which that psychophysical product was utilized as a sign (Twardowski, 
1999a, p. 127). 
 
Twardowski refers, in this context, to the beginning of Husserl’s Logical Investigations 
where he uses the notion of ideal meaning, and argues that the meaning thus understood is 
not something transcendent with respect to psychical functions, something that belongs to 
a third world, but an abstractum resulting from a process of abstraction or concept 
formation that operates on the very content of functions (Twardowski, 2017a, p. 185, §39). 
As a product, meaning forms a concrete whole with the function that actualizes it and thus 
maintains a unilateral dependency relation with it. It cannot exist anywhere else than in the 
intellect that produced it. 
But we saw that Twardowski does not dispute the objective nature of the Gebilde/product 
in the field of logic and more generally in the field of the moral sciences. But he maintains 
that the products’ emancipation from their original functions and from psychology in 
general, and their independence with respect to functions, shall not to be understood as one 
form or another of Platonism. That is why he proposes an explanation of how a psychical 
product acquires its relative independence with respect to functions. The best example lies 
in substitutive products, i.e., products which do not emerge straightforwardly from their 
correlative functions, but by other artificial means. For example, a logical proposition 
deprived from its assertive force or, as he says, as a product that would simply be presented 
in the absence of the judgment’s function (or a “represented judgment” in quotation marks), 
is considered a non-natural product or an “artifact”. This is how he conceives of Bolzano’s 
Sätze an sich as judgments considered independently from the act of judging: 16 
                                               
16 In his 1908-1909 lectures (Twardowski, 2014a, p. 135-136), Twardowski claims that Bolzano was the 
first to clearly make this difference between judging as a mental act and judgment as a product of these acts.  
 
Ein stellvertretendes psychophysisches Gebilde drückt hier aus und bedeutet ein 
stellvertretendes psychisches Gebilde. Aus diesem Zusammenhang heraus ist auch 
am besten zu verstehen, was Bolzano unter Sätzen an sich versteht. Er hat, indem 
er diesen Terminus prägt, eben Gebilde im Sinne, welche von der sie normaler 
Weise erzeugenden Funktion unabhängig gedacht werden, ebenso wie seine 
Vorstellungen an sich (Twardowski, 2017a, p. 187). 
Such propositions are “hypostasized mental products”, conferring on them some sort of 
peculiar being, as if they were something that exists beyond the mind in which they 
originate” (Twardowski, 1999b, p. 136). 
 
6. Psychologism and the delineation of psychology and the humanities 
Let us now return to the question of psychologism as such which is the subject matter of 
the last section of Twardowski’s paper and which is further worked out in an article entitled 
“The Humanities and Psychology”. These two writings seem to corroborate Twardowski’s 
remark in his autobiography according to which the form of psychologism that he 
advocated before the publication of Husserl’s Logical Investigations and which he now 
tries to overcome pertains to the delineation of the field of psychology and that of the 
humanities, including logic, rather than to the problem of the ontological status of laws and 
propositions: 
But my psychologism of that period manifests itself more in the demarcation of the 
material to be dealt with than in the manner of its treatment. For I maintain in 
general that the opposition between psychologism and anti-psychologism in logic 
is ultimately an issue that pertains to the scope of its domain rather than to the 
theoretical grounding of its propositions (Twardowski, 1999c, p. 31). 
This is also his main argument in his lectures on the psychology of thinking in which the 
delimitation of these two domains corresponded rigorously to the distinction between 
mental functions, understood as the proper object of psychology, and logic whose objects 
of study are propositions understood as products or specific contents of judgment. Let’s 
examine more closely Twardowski’s argumentation. 
In the last section of “Actions and Products” (§45), Twardowski again addresses the issue 
of psychologism in emphasizing this time the more general topic of the relationship 
between psychology and the humanities. He challenges Stumpf’s position in his treatise 
“On the classification of sciences” in which, as we saw above, the prior study of products 
belongs to this neutral science called eidology and in which the humanities’s subject matter 
pertains to the complex psychical functions. Against Stumpf, Twardowski proposes to 
repatriate Brentano’s three main normative philosophical sciences, i.e. logic, aesthetics and 
ethics, into the domain of the Geisteswissenschaften by entrusting each of these 
philosophical disciplines with the study of their respective products rather than functions. 
In “The Humanities and Psychology”, Twardowski claims that the objects of the 
humanities are not only products of the human mind (i.e., products of psychical functions 
as such) because they also deal with psychophysical products such as “various 
organizations of communal life, and even the very expression of human speech” which are 
psychophysical products just like jumping or singing (Twardowski, 1999c, p. 136). It also 
provides important details on the subject matter of descriptive psychology and its 
delineation with respect to the other human sciences. For contrary to what the 1914 paper 
might suggest, psychology deals not only with psychical functions but also with products 
of the human mind, i.e., mental products, whereas the subject matter of all the other 
philosophical sciences are merely psychophysical products. Twardowski argues that the 
latter abstract from this factual connection of mental products with mental functions which 
produce them, and treat these products independently of mental life, in which alone they 
can truly exist” (Twardowski, 1999c, p. 136). Hence the definition of the 
Geisteswissenschaften  “as the sciences whose objects [of study] are either mental products, 
considered independently of the mental functions that produce them, or psychophysical 
products, considered as such” (Twardowski, 1999b, p. 139). 
However, descriptive psychology remains a fundamental science among the main 
philosophical sciences and the humanities in general insofar as it is indispensable to explain 
the genesis of the mental and psychophysical products which depend in turn on psychical 
acts or functions. But they remain distinct from psychology which continues to ensure the 
study of primary psychical functions and its founding role for the humanities. This division 
of labor and this classification make it possible, according to Twardowski, to definitively 
dismiss the objection of psychologism: 
Indem man also als das Gebiet der Geisteswissenschaften die psychischen Gebilde 
betrachtet, lässt sich von da aus nicht nur der Begriff der Psychologie als der 
fundamentalen Geisteswissenschaft definieren, sondern auch das Verhältnis der 
Psychologie zu den anderen Geisteswissenschaften sowie das gegenseitige 
Verhältnis der Geisteswissenschaften in einer zugleich strengen und den 
tatsächlichen Verhältnissen gerecht werdenden Weise bestimmen. Inwiefern es sich 
z. B. um das Verhältnis von Logik und Psychologie handelt, dürfte die endgültige 
Schlichtung des Psychologismusstreites eben auf diesem Wege zu erwarten sein. 
Auch die Aufgaben jeder einzelnen Geisteswissenschaft dürften auf dieser 
Grundlage eine Klärung erfahren (Twardowski, 2017a, p. 188). 
 
Final remarks 
To conclude, I would like to briefly assess the relevance of this solution to the problem of 
psychologism based on the function-product distinction and a sharper delineation of 
psychology with respect to logic and the humanities in general. I wonder to what extent 
Twardowski succeeded in overcoming psychologism. Several commentators such as 
Cavallin (1997) in his classical book on Twardowski, seem to be skeptical when they use 
the distinction between methodological and ontological psychologism to explain the 
evolution of Twardowski’s thought on that issue (see Wolenski, 1989; vander Schaar, 
2016, p. 61). Methodological psychologism is understood as the use of the methods of 
psychology in philosophy, perhaps introspection but most certainly the analysis and 
description of mental phenomena, whereas ontological psychologism consists in the claim 
that “objects of a certain type (e.g. values, meanings, judgments) are mental (psychical) 
objects, and the sciences which deal with them (axiology and logic respectively) are parts 
of psychology” (Cavallin, 1977, p. 41). Cavallin, for instance, argues that Twardowski 
advocated these two forms of psychologism before 1902, but after the publication of 
Husserl’s Logical Investigations, he would have abandoned ontological psychologism 
while preserving methodological psychologism.  
The question then arises whether the importance granted to descriptive psychology in 
“Actions and Products” commits Twardowski to something like methodological 
psychologism. I doubt it, and I am rather of Stumpf’s opinion that despite the importance 
of descriptive psychology in Husserl’s Logical Investigations, for example, he was 
certainly not targeted by his own criticism. I agree with Stumpf’s claim in “On the 
classification of sciences” that the form of psychologism targeted by Husserl only concerns 
ultimately the relationship between pure logic, understood as a Wissenschaftslehre, and 
genetic psychology, but not descriptive psychology as such: 
When theorists of knowledge oppose, as Husserl in particular does, the 
amalgamation of psychology with “pure logic,” then it is genetic psychology they 
have in mind, but not descriptive psychology which, in the penetrating research of 
Husserl, represents its privileged object and is used almost at every point. 
Description, distinction, classification of lived acts and the study of their finest 
connections penetrate the whole work (Stumpf, 1906a, p. 200). 
Stumpf’s interpretation seems to be corroborated by Husserl’s remarks in the discussion 
he had with Brentano in Florence in 1907 and in the correspondence thereupon, which 
focused on logical psychologism (see Husserl, 1994b, I, p. 26). Husserl explained to 
Brentano the distinction, in the Prolegomena, between two aspects of logic: logic 
understood as a Kunstlehre or practical discipline, and logic understood as a theoretical 
discipline, i.e., as a theory of science and pure logic. In response to Brentano’s 
apprehensions, Husserl clearly reminds him that to base logic understood as a Kunstlehre 
on psychology is not psychologism. However, as far as this conception of logic is 
attributable to Brentano and most of his students, including Twardowski, he is not directly 
targeted by this criticism. For the form of psychologism described by Husserl in this letter 
is simply the “overestimation of psychology as an alleged fundamental discipline for the 
whole of philosophy, and therefore also for pure logic and the theory of knowledge” (réf.). 
This is what Husserl reminds Brentano in this correspondence and during the discussions 
they had on that subject in Florence in 1907, discussions which clearly did not convince 
Brentano who wrote about psychologism: 
The charge of psychologism has been made against my theory of knowledge. This 
is a word which has lately come into use and when it is spoken many a pious 
philosopher—like many an orthodox Catholic when he hears the term 
Modernism—crosses himself as though the devil himself were in it (Brentano, 
1995, p. 238). 
Many philosophers and psychologists have reacted just like Brentano, who seems to have 
understood this objection as an all-out criticism of psychology. Husserl was therefore 
misunderstood when he said in the Prolegomena that he uses the term psychologism in a 
sense entirely devoid of any pejorative color. Among Brentano’s students, only 
Twardowski and Stumpf (see Fisette, 2015b) seem to have correctly understood the very 
meaning of this objection and especially its bearing on descriptive psychology. 
There is therefore no need to worry about the supposed tensions that exist between the 
Husserl’s arguments against psychologism and the place assigned to descriptive 
psychology in the philosophy of Brentano and his successors, provided that psychologism 
is only attributable to the foundation of logic on genetic or physiological psychology. For 
no student of Brentano, starting with Twardowski, has subscribed to this form of 
psychologism. However, the question remains whether Twardowski succeeded in 
overcoming logical psychologism in his paper “Actions and products” given the 
dependence that he maintains between products and the function of judgment. For this 
dependence between the propositional content of a judgment and the function of judging 
seems to be the target of Twardowski’s argument against psychologism in his lectures on 
the psychology of thinking according to which scientific and logical laws are “apodictic 
and independent from experience, logic being an a priori science” (Twardowski, 2014a, p. 
135; see van der Schaar, 2016, p. 160 f.). This is another way of formulating Ingarden’s 
question in the excerpt quoted at the very beginning of this study, namely, whether 
Twardowski succeeded in finding his way between the Scylla of psychologism and the 
Charybdis of platonism. This question remains open. 
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